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ABSTRACT
A Study in the Distributions of Gains
From International Trade
by
Suhas C. Chakrabartty, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State Univers ity , 1988
Major Profe ssor : Dr. Basudeb Biswas
Department : Economics
In order to investigate the phenomenon of the distribution of
gains from international trade, Arghiri Emmanuel's ideas are firs t
critically discussed, particularly in relation to the traditional
Ricardian framework as applied to labor-surplus economics .
It is found that Emmanuel's concept of unequal exchange, whi ch
has been termed non-equivalent exchange by Jan Otto Anderson, ha s
certain theoretical drawbacks.

In particular, it has been pointed out

that the question involved is not one to prove that the poor countrie s
are actually worse off through trade as suggested by Emmanuel .

Th e

question involved is rather one of redistribution of gains from trade
as ha s been voiced in the search for a new international economi c
order by the members of some developing countries in the U. N.
Such an approach 1eads to the adoption of the concept of a
ge nera 1i zed asymmetric exc hange as the measure of unequa 1 exchange.

viii
This generalization has been achieved in terms of Leontief 's input output analysis. Such a measure coincides with the disjuncti ve
exchange approach when the input-output coefficients are modified
over time .
The Leontief input-output analysis leads to an aggregation
problem which has been solved by taking labor as the only primary
factor of production - an approach standardized by Leontief himsel f.
According to this measure, the extent of unequal exchange can be
quite different from those obtained by the measures suggested by
Emmanuel , Shanin and others. It has been pointed out that there is no
a-priori reason to believe that a poor country nece ssarily gains le ss
than its rich counterpart. Indeed, the test that ha s been made of the
measure in the case of trade between Ecuador and the USA shows that it
is Ecuador rather the U. S. which gains more from trade between them.
The study also suggests some policy recommendations for reducing
unequal exchange with special reference to labor-surplus economics.
(86 pages)

CHAPTER I
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
A farmer in Nigeria might tend his peanuts with as
much diligence and skill as a farmer in Australia
tended his sheep, but the return waul d be very
different ... But the market price gave the Nigerian for
his peanuts a 700 lbs. of grain per acre level of
living , and the Australian for his wool a 1600 lbs .
per acre level of living, not because of differences
in competence, nor because of marginal utilitie s or
productivities in peanuts or wool, but because these
were the respective amounts of food which their
cousins could produce on the family farm s .... (lewis ,
1978 , p. 10)
A. Introduction
The human predicament in the present-day world has many facets.
One of them is the awesome diversity in the living conditions of
people s in different countries of the world . While the highest per
capita income wa s $16 , 330 in Switzerland in 1984

($15,390 in U. S.A. )

the lowest one was $110 in Ethiopia during the same year . According to
a recently released study by the International

labor Organization

based on data collected in 1986, a worker in India toils 12 times more
than his counterpart in Denmark to win his daily bread . The worker in
the USA has to work twice as hard as the Dane, but a Filipino must
spend thrice the time put in by an Indian worker for the same 1oaf
(Weekly Statesman,

1988). Th is

immense diver s ity of incomes

and

living conditions is not a phenomenon which has existed there forever .
Indeed, what is interesting to note is that the present significant
difference in per

capita incomes between the countries of the so-

called North and those of the so-called South seems to have start ed
with the
(1987,

p.

Industrial
149),

Revolution

began

to

which,

bring

about

according
"a

to

Paul

Kennedy

fundamentall y important

transformation in man's economic circumstances" sometime around 1780.
"The elemental truth" about the characteristic of any country before
its

industrial

revolution and modernization was

productivity in traditional

poverty with

low

agriculture . Since agriculture was the

basis of all European and non-European societies, and in countrtie s
like India and China there · existed many traders, textile producer s,
and craftsmen, the differences in per capita income were not enormous.
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 , prepared by Bairoch (see Kennedy, 1987), show how
dramatically the picture changed over the years in consequence of
European industrialization and expansion.
The root cause of these transformations , it is clear, lay in the
st aggering increases in productivity resulting from the Indust r ia l
Revolution . On the basis of the Tables 1.1 and 1.2, Bairoch (see
Kennedy, 1987, p . 149) makes the "remarkable" and "horrifyin g"
suggestion that "whereas the per capita levels of industrialization in
Europe and the Third World may have been not too far apart from each
other in 1800, the latter's was only one-eighteenth of the former' s (2
percent to 35 percent) by 1900, and on 1y one-fiftieth of the Unit ed
Kingdom's

(2

percent to

100 percent) . "

According

to

the World

Development Report, 1986 , the ratio of the average per capita i ncome
of the poor nations to that of

~he

rich nations is now around I :44 ,

and it was estimated to be around 1:40 in the late 1950s.

TABLE 1.1 - CHANGING PATTERN OF THE DISTRIBUTION
OF WORLD MANUFACTURING OUTPUT, 1800-1900
(ADAPTED FROM KENNEDY, I 987, p. I 49)
1800

1830

1860

1880

1900

28.1

34.2

53.2

61.3

62.0

United Kingdom

4.3

9.5

19.9

22.9

18.5

Habsburg Empire

3.2

3.2

4.2

4. 4

4.7

France

Europe

4. 2

5. 2

7. 9

7. 8

6. 8

German States/Germany
3.5

3.5

4.9

8. 5

13.2

Italian States/Italy
2.5

2. 3

2.5

2. 5

2.5

Russia

5. 6

5. 6

7.0

7.6

8.8

United States

0.8

2.4

7.2

14.7

23 . 6

Japan

3.5

2.8

2.6

2.4

2.4

Third World

67.7

60.5

36.6

20 . 9

11.0

China

33.3

29 .8

19 . 7

12 . 5

6.2

India/Pakistan

19.7

17.6

8.6

2.8

1.7

TABLE 1.2- RELATIVE PER CAPITA LEVELS OF AVAILABILITY
OF CAPITAL, 1800-1900 (U .K. IN 1900 = 100)
(ADAPTED FROM KENNEDY , 1987, p. 149)
1800
Europe
United Kingdom

1830

1860

1880

1900

8

11

16

24

35

16

25

64

87

[100]

8

11

IS

23

12

20

28

39

9

IS

25

52

8

10

12

17

8

10

IS

Habsburg Empire
France

9

German States/Germany
8

Italian States/Italy
8

Russia

6

United States

9

Japan

7

7

Third World

6

6

China

6

India

6

14

21

38

69
9

12

4

3

2

6

4

4

3

6

3

It is true that there were interregional and intercontine ntal
movements of goods and services before the Industrial Revolution , but
the years since the Industrial Revolution have seen continuous
increase of trade between the emerging nation-states,

and,

as

a

result, different regions of the world have come cl oser and clo ser
together. As international trade ha s increased, both in absolute and
relative magnitudes, most of the countries of the world ha ve become
more and more open to international trade.
Thus, if

0

stands for the openness of an economy, it can be

defined as
( 1.1)

0 = E/Y

where

stands for exports and

Y stands for nation a 1 income. By

taking logarithms of both s ides of (1.1) and then differentiating them
with respect to time we ha ve
(1.2)

Go= GE - Gy

where Go sta nds for growth of "openness," GE
exports and

Gy

represents growth of

refers to growth of income . The World Deve 1opmen t

Report, 1986, suggests that both the "Low Income Economies" and the
"Industrial Market Economies" with high incomes have positive values
for

Go dur ing the years from

1965 to 1984 indicating increasing

openness. Since countries engage in trade voluntarily , this increasing
openness suggests that trade has been found to be beneficial in some
sense. Theoretical economics of international trade since the days of
the classical economists have tried to provide rigorous justificati on

6

for free trade on the ground that it leads to maximization of gl obal
benefits involving gains to all countrie s involved in trade through
equalization of prices in different countries.
The neoclassical

extension of this

free

trade principle

Heckscher, Ohlin and Samuelson (see Jones and Kenen , 1984)

by
also

predicts that, since movement of goods is a substitute for mo veme nt of
factors of production, there wi 11 be a tendency for factor pri ces to
be equalized in the trading countries . What is needed is free trade or
free movement of goods . Thus, trade should lead us
tendency

towards

equalization

of

per capita

to expect a

incomes

across

international borders . Indeed, this seems to have been the case so fa r
as the trade in manufactured goods between the developed countries i s
concerned. As Table 1.3 clearly indicates, the rapid expansion of
trade in manufactured goods between the developed countri es since th e
Second World War corresponds to a "dramatic" convergence of the wage
rates in those countries between 1959 and 1979 (Ethier, 1983). But, as
pointed out above , the experience of the developing countries vis-a vis the developed ones has been quite a different one . Thi s
difference

in experience poses an important question which no student

of theoretical international trade can afford to ignore.
B. Objective of the Study
Arghiri

Emmanuel

(1972,

p.

263)

has

tried

to explain

this

apparent contradiction in experience in terms of a theory of
"exploitation at a distance"

where

"the enrichment of a minority

would be impossib l e without impoverishing most of the res t of

TABLE 1.3 - DAILY WAGES IN MANUFACTURING IN SELECTED
COUNTRIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE U.S. WAGE*
(ADAPTED FROM ETHIER, 1983, p. 114)

Canada
Japan
Sweden
France
Italy
West Germany
U.K.

u.s.

1959

1979

.82

.95
.82

.11

.39
.27
.23
. 29
.29

1.09

1.00

1.00

.60

.72
1. 07

.76

*Consider 8 man-hour/day.
mankind."

He maintained that, instead of promoting growth in the

developing countries, international trade has led to a new kind of
"imperialism" through unequal exchange.
Since Emmanuel (1972) advanced the concept of unequal exchange i t
has been developed in a number of directions . The following study will
concentrate on investigating its role in the field of development
economics. Specifically the objectives are to :
(1) critically examine the alternative approaches to unequ al
exchange;
(2)

develop a suitable measure of unequal exchange;

(3) develop testable propositions from the adopted approach t o
unequal exchange;
(4) empirically test for unequal exchange on the basis of t he
measure developed; and
(5)

develop policy prescriptions to reduce unequal exchange.

8

C. Procedure to be Followed
The following discussion is divided into six chapters.

Chapt er 1

is introductory and discusses the objectives and the procedure to be
followed

in the study.

The three different approaches

exchange have been discussed in Chapters 2, 4, and

to unequal

5. Since t he

concept was originally proposed by the Greek economist Emmanuel, hi s
concept of unequal exchange has been discussed in Chapter 2.

It i s

contrasted with the Ricardian concept of unequal exchange, and th en
the role of that concept in development economics is investigat ed.
Emmanuel' s concept of unequa l exchange leads to

certain problems

which have been discussed in Chapter 3 . The two other approaches to
unequal exchange are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 with criticisms of
them. The main criticism that has been l eve l ed is against the fa ct
that the se concepts have been developed by considering labor as t he
only factor of production and other factors of production have bee n
ignored. In order to look for a suitable measure of unequal exchang e
these concepts

have been generalized to take account of all

the

factors of production . Such a generalization has been made in terms of
the

Leontief

genera li zed

(1968)

input-output

ana lysi s.

approach the measure that has

In

terms

been adopted

of

this

here

is

discussed in Chapter 5.
The Leontief (1968) input-output approach leads to a proble m of
aggregation which has been solved by assuming

labor as

the only

primary factor of production - a procedure standardized by Leontief
himself .

This

helps

to

arrive

at

testable

measures

fo r

un equ al

9

exchange. Chapter 5 also discusses the results of the application of
the measures to the case of trade between Ecuador and the USA. This
particular application

is essentially

illustrative

(Lewis,

1972).

Ecuador has been chosen because it is a developing country whose
input-output tables are readily available. Nothing conclusive can be
arrived at from one such test alone. But, groundwork has been laid in
this study so that similar tests can be done in the future when
sufficient input-output and ancillary data
makes an overview of the

are available. Chapter 6

study and discusses

recommendations to reduce unequal exchange.

certain

pol icy

10

CHAPTER II
UNEQUAL EXCHANGE IN THE NON-EQUIVALENT SENSE
The term "unequal

exchange" was

first proposed by the Gree k

economist Arghi ri Emmanuel (1972) to indicate the

phenomenon th at

when goods are exchanged between the "rich" and the "poor" nation s ,
the poor nations pay more in terms of labor than

the amount of labor

embodied in the good they receive in return. Jan Otto Anderson (1976)
has

categorized

this type

in non-equivalent sense.

of unequal exchange as unequal exchange
He has distinguished two other type s of

unequal exchange, namely "disjunctive exchange" and "asymmetri c
exchange." By asymmetric exchange he implies that kind of unequal
exchange where the gains in labor-time through trade are unequal .
Thus, if Country I

saves 10 labor units by trading with Country 2,

which saves IS labor units, then

exchange is asymmetric and fa vor s

Country 2. Disjunctive exchange, on the other hand, implies that th e
effects of trade on developments. in different countries are different.
Thus , even if the exporters and importers are gaining, Country 2 as a
whole may be worse off from trade with Country I, which may be able t o
transform trade into a profitable concern from the whole country' s
point of view. These concepts

will be discussed in greater detail i n

their proper places .
Emmanuel's book, Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of
Trade (1972, p. 274), is a critique of the "dogma of the theory of
comparative costs and the benefits of the capitalist internation al
division of labor." Emmanuel thinks that the assumptions of immobility

II

of labor and capital in the Ricardian model are no longer appropriat e .
According to him, the realistic assumptions for the present-day worl d
would be those of immobile labor and mobile capital. Immobility of
1abor between countries 1eads to different
countries depending on the prevailing

wage rates in different

"institutional"

and

"socio-

historical" conditions, like surplus population, predominance of
family farming,

lack of proper development of markets, and so on.

Mobility of capital,

on

the other hand,

leads

to

"internati onal

equalization of profits," so that, according to Emmanuel, the Marxian
propositions regarding prices of production remain valid on an
international

scale.

As will be explained below, according to Marx the value of a
commodity depends on the total labor embodied in that commodity whi ch
includes not only the direct labor needed to produce it, but also t he
indirect labor needed to produce other factors of production .
Equilibrium relative prices of commodities (values-in-exchange) ,
however, are not determined simply by taking the ratios of the total
amounts of labor embodied

in

them.

This

is done

in

the

si mple

Ricardian model where production is a function of labor alone. Since
in the Marxian model producers use capital in production, the retur n
to capital must be the same in the production of all commodities. Onl y
then intersectoral flow of capital will
prevail. In equilibrium

stop and equilibrium will

the market prices of production (same as th e

prices of commodities) in a competitive

economy are determined by a

mark-up over the cost of labor necessary to produce them . This mark - up
implies

an

exploitation of labor

in the

sense

that ,

though

t he

12

products are produced by labor, the laborers get only a fraction of
the market price. Since the prices of production under capitalism are,
according to Marx , based on exploitation, Emmanuel thinks that pric ing
of commodities on an international scale lays
international exploitation

bare the "mechanism" of

where "one nation exploits another" - the

so-called "exploitation at a distance."
This exploitation takes place through the mechanism of une qual
exchange, whereby the poor nations pay more in terms of their nati onal
1abor than they receive in exchange from the rich nations . Emmanue 1 's
explanation proceeds in terms of the Marxian theory of value and
prices. According to the law of value, the value of a commodity may be
writ ten as
c + v + m = V = totai value
where c stands for Constant Capital representing the cost of raw
materials (or other capital

goods)

used,

v for Variable Capita l

representing expenditures on direct labor, and m for Surplus Valu e
created by necessary labor and appropriated by the capitalist. Thi s
surplus originates out of the fact that the laborers need only a
fraction of their tot a1 working time to produce the goods that their
wages can buy. Whatever they produce with the rest of their working
time goes to build up the profit of the employer.
With reference to this concept of value,

certain rates are

defined as follows. The rate of surplus value is given by
m' = m/v = rate of surplus value.

13

The organic composition of

capital

measure s

per

capit al

availability of capital and materials , and is defined as
q = cj (c + v) = organic composition of capital.
It is analogous to the concept of (Fixed Cost/(Fixed Cost + Vari able
Cost) ratio in the neoclassical

terminology . Finally , the r at e of

profit i s defined as

mj(c + v) = t

or

m/( c + v) = T

Emmanue 1 (1972) uti 1 i zes these concepts to show how the opening
of trade leads to unequal exchange in the non-equivalent sense. He
envisages countries A and B with unequal profit rates in autarky; ·th at
is , in equilibrium before trade (e.g., 20% and
After

trade

with

mobile

capital,

they

33 1/ 3% respectivel y) .
emerge

with

a co mmon

intermediate profit rate (e.g., 25%). Both the countries are assumed
to have the same three industries (e.g . , I wine, II cloth and II I
food) . His point of view can be illustrated by means of Table 2.I and
Table 2. 2 as follows .

He assumes that the profit rate would be l ower

in the country where the wage-rate is higher . The rea son for his
assuming this is that the organic composition of capital,

(q) , is

different in the two countries, and, as the organic composition of
capital increases relatively more rapidly in the course of capitali s t
development, the rate of profit, according to Marx , tends to fall.
Moreover, according to Samuel son (I 979), if the same Leont i ef -Sra ff a
technologies would exist everywhere,

Emmanuel

would

be

right ,

suppo s ing that a lower real wage would imply a higher profit rate .

in

14

TABLE 2. I

PRICES OF PRODUCTION IN AUTARKY
IN COUNTRY A AND IN COUNTRY B
(ADAPTED FROM EMMANUEL, 1972, pp. 53-54)
-

m

Branches

Constant
Capital

Variable
Capital

Surplus
Variable

Value
c+v+

Rate of
Profit

Profit
T (c+v)

Price of
Production
= c+v+p

Country A

80

20

20

120

20%

10

110

30

130

II

90

10

III

70

30

240

60

60

360

20

120

20%

20

120

20%

20

120

60

360

Country B

II
III

40

20

20

80

33 1/3%

20

80

50

10

10

70

33 1/3%

20

80

33 1/3%

30

30

30

90

120

60

60

240

20

80

60

240

15

TABLE 2.2 - POST -TRADE EQUILIBRIUM PRICES OF PRODUCTION
IN COUNTRY A AND B TAKEN TOGETHER
(ADAPTED FROM EMMANUEL, 1972, p. 55)
Country A and B Together

--------------------------------------------------c

v

m

v

T

!A

80

20

20

120

25%

25

125

IIA

90

10

10

110

25%

25

125

IliA

70

30

30

130

25%

25

125

240

60

60

360

25%

75

375

p

IB

40

20

20

80

25%

15

75

I IB

50

10

10

70

25%

15

75

I I IB

30

30

30

90

25%

15

75

120

60

60

240·

25%

45

225

360

120

120

600

120

600
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"in supposing that the poor country must have the higher profit r a t e ,
for a lower real wage can occur only with a higher profit rate . " Th us,
i n hi s tables , Country A has a lower rate of profit and Country B
has a higher rate of profit under autarky . He a l so assumes the sa me
rate of surplus value in all

the industries in both the countri e s ,

namely 100%, which continues to prevail even after trade.
It can be pointed out that, according to Marx,

in a c apitali s t

world , if every branch of production has the same organic compositi on
of capital, the law of value would be "directly controlling for th e
prices . " But, since the organic composition of capital differs

f ro m

one branch of production to another , and since the profit rates sho ul d
be

the

same

in

all

branches

of production

under equilibrium,

t he

prices of commodities (what Marx calls "prices of production") will be
made up of the capital expended in production (c+v), plus a mark-u p
for profit calculated as a certain percentage of the capital outla y .
This percentage is nothing but the average rate of profit and is f ound
by dividing the total surplus value by total social capital (Swee zy,
1942) .
Thus, with reference to Table 2 . 1,

the average rate of profi t

before trade in Country A is
60

I (240 + 60) = 60 1 300

20%.

Similarly , the average rate of profit in Country B is
60

I

1120 + 60) = 60

1

ISO
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113%.

Since the total capital invested in Country A in all the branches of
production is !00, total profit is 20 in all the branche s . Thus , t he
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pr i ces of production in Country A are given by
c

v

p

80

20

20

120

II

90

10

20

120

III

70

30

20

120

L

In a s imilar way the figures for the prices of production in Count ry 8
have been calculated.
Emmanuel (1972) then considers two situations. In Situation I he
assumes that the two countries enter into exchange with one anoth er
under the condition that there is no international mobility of capital
so that the different profit rates are maintained in the

two

countries . Now "if all the three articles produced participated in
exchange in the proportions supposed," then, "the three articles of
Country 8, taken together" would exchange "at the rate of 360 for 240 ,
against the three articles of Country A, taken together ."
When this happens, there is, according to Emmanuel (1972), equal
exchange, since 120 units (60+60) of B's direct labor, which he terms
"national 1 iving labor", exchange for 120 units (60+60) of A's direct
labor .

Emmanuel does not discuss how the ratio at which the goods are

exchanged, name 1y 3/2 which is same as 360/240, is determined. It can
be presumed that it is exogenously determined. At this price ratio
there is, according to Emmanuel, equal exchange, since to produce 3
units of the commodities in A one unit of direct (living) labor i s
needed,

and also one unit of direct

(1 iving)

produce 2 units of the commodities in B.

labor

is needed

to

Emmanue 1 does not conside r
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past labor on the grounds that it has already been "valoriz ed"; that
is, it has already been taken into account in the det ermin atio n of it s
past value. What he seems to imply can be explained as follows. The
amount of surplus value depends on the rate of exploitation which, in
the Marxian sense, is a ratio of unpaid total labor to paid to tal
labor (Morishima, 1973). Thus, the past labor has already been tak en
into account when value has been estimated. There will

be do uble

co unting if past labor is again included .
In

Situation

II

capital

can

circulate

freely

acr oss

international borders equalizing the profit rates as shown in Count ry
A and B together . Now , the exchange rate between the commodities of
Country B and those of Country A would no longer be 120 for 80, but
would be 125 for 75 .

Apparently this happens because the profit rate

in Country A rises and that in Country B falls.

As the price i n

Co untry A rises and that in Country B falls , the terms of trade move
against B. Since under Situation I there is equal exchange, Situation
II implies unequal exchange whereby value is being "transferred" fro m
Country B to Country A, impoverishing the former.
Emmanuel's concept of unequal exchange is based on the Marxi an
labor theory of value. Marx himself borrowed heavily fr om the labor
theory of value of Ricardo,
systematic explanation of the

who for the first
phenomenon

of

time ,

provid ed

inte r national

a

trade.

Before a critique of Emmanuel is developed in the next chapter,

it

would be worthwhile to look into some of the implications of th e
Ricardian theory which are relevant in this context.
Indeed , it is quite intriguing to note that unequal excha ng e in
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the non-equivalent sense can also be illustrated within the fram ework
of Ricardo's comparative cost principles of trade,

based on a la bor

theory of value . He pointed out that the basis of trade

is

difference in comparative costs prevailing in the countries in th eir
autarkic positions of equilibrium.
Ricardo's theory of comparative costs can be illustrated wi th
referen ce to a simplified world of two countries called the North and
the South producing two goods in which the real

labor cost s of

producing one unit of X would be 5 man-hours in the North and 10 man hours in the South, while those of producing one unit of Y would be 2
man-hours in the North and 20 man -hours in the South.

In

thi s

situation, according to Ricardo, the North has a comparative advantage
in the production of Y and the South has a comparative advantage i n
the production of X.

The North would specialize in the production of

Y to export it in exchange for X for which the South would enjoy a
comparative advantage. If the terms of trade were anywhere between 5/2
and 1/2, trade would be beneficial for both the North and the South.
If , for example the terms of trade were 1: 1, by trading one Y for on e
X, the North would save 3 man-hours per unit, compared to producti on
of X at home. Using this extra labor time, 1.5 more units of Y woul d
be produced over and above one unit of X obtai ned through exchang e .
Similarly , the South could save 10 man-hours by trading one unit of X
for one unit of Y. With this extra 10 man -hours, it caul d produc e
unit more of X over and above 1 unit of Y obtained through trade.
Even though trade is beneficial for both countries , the amoun ts
of labor exchanged are not the same. In order to produce one unit of
Y, the North needs only 2 units of labor, whereas the South need s 10
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units of its labor to produce one unit of X.

Thus , one unit of

Northern labor would exchange for 5 units of Southern labor. Thi s
would imply unequal exchange in the sense of non-equivalent trad e,
showing that the factoral terms of trade would be in favor of th e
North and against the South. In contrast, equal exchange would preva i l
in the equivalent sense if equal amounts of labor were exchanged ,
given the commodity terms of trade. This would imply that the fact or al
terms of trade would be equal to one .
It can be pointed out that unequal exchange in the Ricardi an
model, as in Emmanuel's presentation, arises out of trade.

In t he

Ricardian system under autarky, that is, in equilibrium before trad e,
there is no unequa 1 exchange because the commodities in each country
exchange in the ratio of their labor costs.

Since the equilibrium

terms of trade are stated at a point different from the autarkic pri ce
ratios, the commodities are no longer exchanged in the ratio of th ei r
labor costs . This gives rise to unequal exchange in the sense of non equivalent trade.
A. Basis of Unequal Exchange in the Non-Equivalent Sense
According to Emmanuel (1972),
cause of inequality of exchange.

inequality of wages is alone th e
In his opinion present -day reali ty

is one in which capital is mobile, but labor is immobile, and that
"sufficient" immobility of labor ensures that the prevailing lo ca l
differences in wages, due to the socio-cultural elements, cannot be
eliminated (Emmanuel, 1972).

The wage rates are independent of price s

s ince they are determined "institutionally" by the overall supply and
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demand for labor in the eco nomic s, but they, in turn determine vari ous
price s .

The relation between the wage ratio and the factoral terms of

t r ade , showing unequal exchange, can be establi shed with reference to
equilibrium in the foreign sector in each cou ntry as follows
Value of export = Value of import
measured in the prices of the country under consideration .

Assu ming

constant returns to scale and labor as the only factor of producti on,
the value of exports can be given by
Val ue of export = MPLx . Lx . Px
where MPLx stands for the marginal productivity of labor in export (X)
and is equal to the average productivity of l abor in X, (APLx), Lx for
the amount of labor employed in the production of X and Px is t he
price of X. Similarly,
Value of import = MPLy . Ly . Py
assuming t hat MPLy

APLy. Thus,

or, Wx . Lx

= Wy . Ly

or, Lx I Ly = Wy I Wx .
Thus, the ratio of the amounts of labor exchanged is equivalent to th e
ratio of wages. In this sense, the factoral terms of trade showing th e
ratio of the amounts of labor exchanged can also be regarded as
equivalent to the ratio of wages.
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In order to di scuss the basis of unequal exchange in the non equivalent sense in the Ricardian framework, suppose that aLX and aL Y
are the real labor co sts of producing 1 unit of X and 1 unit of Yin
the North, and a*LX

and

a* LY

are the real labor costs of produ cing

1 unit of X and 1 unit of Y in the South. If , for example ,

aLX = 1,

aL Y = 1, a*LX = 3 , and a*LY = 4, the North will export Y and th e Sou th
will export X.

Under these conditions,

possibility or transformation curve, ABC,

the world pro du c t ion is shown in Figure 2 . 1,

where the straight line AB is given by

Similarly, the equation for the line BC is given by
a* LX. X + a* Ly. Y
(2.2) or, Y

Under

=

L*

L*/a * LY - (a * LX/a * LY) .X
the

special

conditions assumed, the

slope of AB i s -1.

Similarly , the slope of the BC portion is -3/ 4, and the intercept on
the Y-axis is determined by L* and the value of a* LY·
From the given conditions it is clear that the pattern of trad e,
by which we mean the commodities that different countries will expo rt
and import , is determined entirely by technological conditions.
exact terms
(a*Ly; a*Lxl·

of trade can

be

anywhere

The

between (aly/ aLxl and

They are determined by the prevailing demand co nditi ons
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FIGURE 2.1. WORLD PRODUCTION POSSIBILITY CURVE IN A
TWO-COUNTRY TWO-COMMODITY CASE
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as shown in Figure 2.2 which is drawn from Figure 2.1 . In equilibri um
we have
(2.3)

W MPLy . Py

(1 / aly).Py

an d

W* = MPL * x·P * X= (1/a * LX).P * X

(2.4)

where W and w*

are the real wage rates in the North and the Sou th

respectively, and MPLy and MPL\ are the marginal productivitie s of
labor in

Y in the North and in X in the South respectively . Assumi ng

that in equilibrium the same prices would prevail in both the
co untries,

the "Fundamental Theorem Of Unequal

Exchange"

(Gibs on,

1980), showing the relationship between the factoral terms of trad e,
f, and the commodity terms of trade, t, would be given by

or,
(2 . 6)

f = w*; w = (MPL*x/MPLy).(Px/Py) = (MPL*/MPLy.t

These equations show that the factoral terms of trade depend on labor
productivities in the traded goods sectors in the two countrie s .
According to Emmanuel there waul d be equal exchange if

f = I. But,

since the same price ratio (Px/Py) would prevail in the two countr ies
in equilibrium after trade, the basis for trade in the Ri cardian model
lies in the differences in labor productivities in the two countrie s,
which, from (2.5) or (2.6), implies that there would always be unequ al
exchange in trade in the Ricardian model.
on the technology used.

Labor productivity depe nds

Thus, in the Ricardian model the basi s of
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Y +Y 1
FIGURE 2.2. DETERMINATION OF THE COMMODITY TERMS OF· TRADE
BY RELATIVE DEMAND AND RELATIVE SUPPLY
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unequal exchange lies in the differen ces in technology in the trad ed
goods sectors in the two countries, the extent of unequal exchange
being a function of the productivity difference and the commodit y
terms of trade between the two countries .
It

would

be

worthwhile

to

investigate

the

effects

of

techno logical changes on unequal exchange in a Ricardian frame work .
Equati ons (2.5) and (2.6) imply

o

(2. 7)

a f l a t=

(2.8)

a f 1 a a* LX

-(aLy).tl(a*Lxl2 <

a f 1 a aLY

tla * LX > 0

(2.9)

(aLyla\xl >

o

Equation (2. 7) shows that the movement of the factoral terms of
trade depends directly on the movement of the commodity terms of
trade. Equation (2.8) and (2.9) show the effects of technical changes
on the factoral terms of trade, on the assumption that the commodi ty
terms of trade are not affected by technical changes . Since techni cal
changes are likely to affect the commodity terms of trade, a more
thorough approach would need an analysis involving changes in all the
var iables . This can be done by taking the total deri va tives . If (2.5)
and

(2 . 6) are written as
f = a . b

productivities of labor and b for the commodity terms of trade , the
to tal derivative of f is given by
(2 .10)
(2. II)

df = a
or, dfl da

db + b
=

a . dbl da

da
+ b
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Equations (2.10) and (2.11) show that the effects of technical chang es
on factoral terms of trade can be captured properly by taking note of
the possible effects on the terms of trade . The problem can be pursu ed
in still greater detail if, instead of the factoral terms of trad e,
attention is focused on the equilibrium

wage equations (2.3) or

(2.4). Logarithmic differentiation of (2.3) gives

d ln W d ln MPLy + d ln Py
or,
( 2. 12)

dW/W = dMPLy/MPLy + dPy/Py

The first term on the right-hand side of (2.12) can be assumed to be
equivalent to the productivity

growth rate, dQ/Q. The second term

involving the rate of change of the price of Y is related to th e
growth rate of output as follows . If E stands for price elasticity of
demand, it is defined as
E = (dQ/Q)/(dPy/Py)
so that
dPy/Py

(dQ/Q)/ E.

Thus, from (2.12)
(2 .13)

dW/W = (I + 1/ E) . (dQ/Q)

Since E is negative, if the absolute value of E is greater

tha n

one, then dW/W is positive, showing that technical progress in Y would
improve the wage rate, resulting in a tendency for the factoral term s
of trade to improve. If , on the other hand , the absolute value of E is
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less than one, then dW/W i s negative. This indicate s that the effect
of technical progress in Y will decrease the wage rate, resulting in a
tendency for the factoral terms of trade to deteriorate.
The above analysis s hows that the effect of technical progre ss on
factoral terms of trade is indeterminate in the Ricardian framework.
It can be po inted out, however, that the effect of technical progre ss

on the commod ity terms of trade is always negative in the Ricardia n
framework , but the possibility of improvement in the factoral terms of
trade vanishes in Lewi s's model of a labor surplus economy if th e
technical improvement in its export sector is not accompanied by any
technical

improvement

in the food

sector (Lewis,

1969).

Th is

highlights the special problem faced by many developing poor countrie s
of the present-day world . In developing his ideas, Lewis has used an
ingenious way to determine the commodity terms of trade , which , in the
Ricardian framework, remain indeterminate between the autarkic pric e
ratios. He assumes a situation in which the North produces steel and
food, while the South produces food and coffee. One unit of North ern
labor can produce 3 units of steel or 3 units of food , whereas one
unit of Sout hern labor can produce I unit of food or I unit of coffee.
The North and the South exchange steel and coffee, but food is not
traded .
Under such a situation the commodity terms of trade between steel
and

coffee will

be

1:1 ,

showing

unequal

exchange

in

the

non -

equivalent sense, because to produce I unit of coffee the South needs
I unit of labor , but the North needs only 1/ 3 of a la bor unit to
produce I unit of stee l. Lewis's (1969) model is also different f rom
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Ricardo's in the sense that it can accommodate equal exchange whi ch
the Ricardian model cannot. Thus,

if the productivity of South ern

labor is 3 in food, the equilibrium commodity terms of trade would be
3: I,

and I unit of Southern labor waul d exchange for

I unit of

Northern labor.
If the productivity of Southern labor increases in the product ion
of coffee, the commodity terms of trade would move against the Sou t h a result which is also true in the Ricardian model . Thus, for exampl e,
if labor productivity per head in the South doubles, the equilibriu m
terms of trade would be 1:2 between steel and coffee, but this wi ll
not affect the

factoral terms of trade.

If, however, productivit y of

labor per head in the South increases in the non-traded food sect or
instead of the

traded coffee

sector,

both

the factoral

and

th e

commodity terms of trade in the South will improve.
Lewis ' s (1969) presentation assumes constant returns to scale and
does not consider any demand conditions.

It can be shown that even i n

a general equilibrium model where "demand plays an important role" and
"transformation curves are nicely concave to the origin" techni cal
changes in the nonfood sectors in the poor country

are "unimportant "

in influencing its factoral terms of trade, while technical changes in
the food sector are

(Bardhan,

1982). These asymmetric effects of

technical progress on factoral terms of trade
follows . In the Lewis model ,

agricultural

can be explained as

production

in the less

developed countries takes place mostly on family farms, which aim at
maximizing total output. This implies that the wage rate is determine d
by the average productivity of labor rather than by the margin al
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productivity of labor. This is shown in Figure 2.3. With unlim ited
supply of labor, this wage rate becomes a constant (Figure 2.4) and ,
when there is technical progress in the export sector, the effec t i s
only a reduction

in the

price of the commodity leading

to a

deterioration of the terms of trade as is evident from equations (2.3 )
and (2.4). In the case of a developed country a rise in producti vity
of labor from MPLE to MPL'E in the export sector leads to an incr eas e
in the general wage rate and an improvement in the factoral terms of
trade . This is shown in Figure 2.5. To the extent that the factor a l
terms

of trade

are

an

indicator of well-being,

the

position

of

developing countries becomes more and more precarious in the face of
technical improvement in non-food sectors .
Possible impacts

on the terms of trade in the face of techni ca l

progress has long been a topic of discussion in development economi cs.
Edgeworth (see Findlay, I981), Bhagwati (1958) and others found i n
technical progress the possibility of a country of being "damnifi ed"
or "immiserized". In the present context the hypothesis that is of
special importance

is the Prebisch-Singer theory based on Prebi sch

(1950) and Singer (I950) which says that "there is a systematic bias
in the distribution of the gains from trade against the developi ng
countries, revealed by a secu lar adverse tendency in their terms of
trade" (Find l ay , I98I, p. 428). Findlay (1981) has identified th ree
major strands in the argument behind the

Prebisch-Singer

hypothes is.
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0

FIGURE 2.3. DETERMINATION OF THE WAGE RATE IN A
LABOR-SURPLUS FAMILY FARM

FIGURE 2.4. EFFECT OF TECHN ICAL PROGRESS IN THE EXPORT
SECTOR IN A LABOR-SURPLUS ECONOMY
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L
FIGURE 2.5. EFFECT OF TECHNICAL PROGRESS IN THE EXPORT
SECTOR IN A FULL-EMPLOYMENT ECONOMY
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They are:
(I) The income-elasticity of demand for imports
from the South is low in the North while it is high in
the South for imports from the North . (2)
Techno 1og i ca 1 progress in the North tends to reduce
the demand for imports from the South, while
technological progress in the South tends to occur in
the export sector. (3) The structure of product and
factor markets tends to be much more monopolistic in
the North than in the South, because of the existence
of large corporations and well-organised labour
unions. This makes technological progress lead to a
rise in incomes in the North, whereas it 1eads to a
decline in the relative prices of
exportable
products in the South .
(Findlay, 1981, pp.428- 429).
Following the arguments of Edgeworth (see Findlay , 198 1),
Bhagwati (1958), Rybczynsky (1955) and others, Sodersten (1964) ha s
developed a mode l which predicts a completely different trend for the
terms of trade between the North and the South.

If the North is

ident ified as the capital-abundant country and the South as the labo rabundant one, the North will export the capital-intensive good and th e
South will export the labor -intensive good . An additional hypothe sis
cou ld

be

that

the

income-elasticity

of demand

for

the

capital -

intensive good is greater than unity, and of the labor-intensive good
less than unity, though both are positive. Capital

accumulation in

either country would then turn the terms of trade against the Nor th
while population growth in either country would turn them in fav or of
the South. Since capital accumulation tends to proceed faster th an
population growth in both regions, the model would seem to indicate a
pres umption for terms of trade to move in favor of the South.
Now some clarification is required .
trade, Px and Py

Since in equilibrium aft er

are the same in both the countries from equati ons
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(2.3) and (2.4), W will be higher than w* if the va lue of MPLy i s
greater than the value of MPL*x· Now, s uppo se that there i s

techni cal

progress in the producti on of X in the South so that MPL* x rises.
of the following re s ult s can occur.

(a)

Any

If the Sout h is a small

cou ntry, Px does not fall and w* rises, leading to an improvement in
the South's factoral
result.

terms of trade , which is the usua l Ricardia n

(b) If the Sout h is a large country, Px can fall and l ead to

the Bhagwa t i case of "i mmi seri zing trade" if techni ca 1 i mproveme nt i s
due to trade . (c) Depending on the magnitude of the rise of MPL*x and
the f all of Px, the rise or fall of w* and , hence , the improvemen t or
deterioration of the South's fa c toral

terms

of trade will

be

determi ned. (d) The Lewi s ian result, mentioned above, follows becaus e
the produ ct ivity of labor on the hou se hold farm is constant, in spit e
of technical changes in the non-food sec tor. This lead s t o the wag e
rate being in s titutionally fixed at labor's

average productivity on

the hou sehold farm . In this case, a rise in MPL\ will be matc hed by a
correspond ing fall

in Px, leading to a deterioration of the South 's

commod ity terms of trade as shown by Lewis . (e) The Soders t en case is
analogous to case (b) above , where improvement in MPLy in the Nort h
can lead to a fall in Py

and hence its terms of trade , if that is no t

reflected in a corresponding rise in W .
In rea lity, the income effects within the economy following fro m
the technical improvement cannot be ignored. They can have significant
influence on

demand and on prices (Spraos, 1983; Mcintosh , 1986).

Bu t , in eq uilibrium, we end up with relations s uch as

(2.3) and

(2.4), which s how that technical changes can account fo r changes in
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all of W, MPL and P.

In terms of (2.3) and (2.4), the Prebisch-Sing er

hypothesis is a distinct possibility

because

low income-elasti city

of demand for imports from the South can lead to a deterioration of
the terms of trade due to technical improvement. Thus, given all the se
hypotheses, it is apparent that the movement of the facotral and the
commodity terms of trade cannot be determined

from theory alon e.

Theory can discuss only the possibilities. What will actually happ en
depends on the prevailing conditions.
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CHAPTER Ill
A CRITIQUE OF EMMANUEL'S CONCEPT OF UNEQUAL EXCHANGE
Emmanuel's (1972) presentation of unequal exchange in the nonequivalent sense raises some questions of great importance.

In the

first place, his theory does not provide any basis for trade.

If the

total industrial output does not rise because of trade, trade cannot
be justified.

Indeed,

it is "profoundly wrong" to leave the after -

trade industry totals the same as they were before trade (Samuelso n,
1979). According to Emmanuel, the producers in the South (Country B)
procure a higher rate of profit s i nee the wage rate there is 1ower
than that in the North (Region A); they should have no incentive to
engage in trade which equalizes profits and, hence, lowers their rates
of profit

(Sau,

1984) . One can argue,

however,

that once

the

boundaries are thrown open and capital can freely move across national
borders, the capitalists in the poor nations will not be able to stop
the inflow of capital. This, of course, contradicts another Marxian
theory where the state is controlled by the bourgeoisie .
Secondly, since profit rates are equalized, exploitation of the
developing countries must imply a higher rate of surplus value.

In

Emmanuel's presentation each country continues to have the same rate
of surplus value as it had before trade, namely

100%. What he claims

to be "exploitation of one nation by another"

seems to be an

exploitation of the bourgeoisie in the poor country by those in th e
rich country.

The surplus

value which

the

local

bourgeoisie were
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exploiting is now flowing out of the country. This foreign surplu s i s
appropriated by the bourgeoisie in the rich country.

According to

Emmanuel's presentation , the workers there do not benefit fro m th i s,
but the workers in the poor country are not losers either. More over ,
the inflow of capital will at least help raise the productivity of
labor in the non-food sector. If the workers cannot benefit from this,
the producers will . Thus, the situation is more comp 1ex than imag ined
by Emmanuel .
Thirdly, Emmanuel's concept of unequal exchange is ambiguous. I f
the exchange of a 1arger amount of 1abor is associ a ted with a 1arger
amount of benefit, it may not be called unequal. He seems to i mply
that the benefits from trade are equa 1 for the countries i nvo 1ved, so
that the payment of different costs would imply unequal exchange. But ,
Emmanuel

has almost nothing to say

in

the case

in which

larger

expenditure of labor is associated with a larger amount of benefit.
Moreover, it is worthwhile

in this connection to mention that

with Emmanuel a deterioration in the term s of trade is necessaril y
harmful. That this need not be so can be illustrated by the followin g
figures (Lindert, I986) . Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 show how the terms
of trade are determined by the intersection of the demand curve AB and
the supply curve CD. In Figure 3.1 they intersect at E to determin e
the equi librium terms of trade.

In Figure 3.1 the net gain to the

soc iety is given by the area AEC. The terms of trade can fall
either of two ways.

It can fall

in

either by a reduction in foreign

demand for the home export good (Figure 3 .I), or, by a rise in th e
domestic s upply of the export good (Figure 3.2) .

In the case of
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FIGURE 3.1. A DETERIORATION OF THE COHHODITY TERMS OF TRADE
FOLLOWING A DECREASE IN FOREIGN DEMAND

A
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FIGURE 3.2. A DETERIORATION THE COMMODITY TERMS OF TRADE FOLLOWING
A TECHNICAL IMPROVE~1ENT IN THE EXPORT SECTOR
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Figure 3.1 the area AEC decreases, where as the corre s ponding are a in
Figure

3.2 increases, showing that in the former ca se the count ry's

position deteriorates and improves in the latter.
This point has been more elaborately put
(1984) .

Following

Bacha

(1978),

he

forward

assumes

that

by

Findl ay

the

North

specializes in steel and the South in coffee. If the superscript s N
and S s tand for the North and the South respectively , then qN i s the
output of steel per unit of labor in the North and

qS

is the outp ut

of coffee per unit of labor in the South. wN and ws are the real wa ges
fixed in terms of steel. The common rate of profit is r while pis th e
relative price of coffee in terms of steel .
beginning of each

Wages are

paid at th e

production period which is assumed to be one f or

both the goods. All these assumptions imply:

so that

This equation

shows

trade of the South,

p,

that the commodity or "net barter" terms of
is a function of the wage rates

and

th e

productivities. The double factoral terms of trade, f, are related t o
p

by:

From (3.1) it follows that f is equal to unity if, and only if,
ws

wN . Under such a situation "the amount of foreign labor embodied

in imports per unit of domestic 1abor embodied in exports is equa 1 t o
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unity" (Findlay, 1984, pp. 192-193). According to Emmanuel (1972), t he
South suffers from "unequal exchange" since

wS < wN. It implie s th at

the South gets commodities worth less than a day's labor in the Nor th
in ex change for commodities worth a day ' s labor in the South.
To s how how the concept of unequal exchange can be misleadi ng
Findlay assumes a situation where initially there is equal exchan ge
with wS = wN . If

qN and wN both increase in the same proportion vi i th

no change in qS and ws,

the double factoral

terms of trade wi ll

deteriorate from unity, but the rate of profit and the commodity terms
of trade will not be affected. There is now unequal exchange
though the well-being

of the South is unaffected, since it

even
st ill

gets the same amount of steel per unit of coffee exported .
It can be pointed out that

the commodity terms of trade will

improve in favor of the South if wN does not increase as much as qN
does . This implies that
deteriorate

since

ws is

the double factoral

term s of trade must

constant while wN is higher. Thus,

"t he

South's gain from trade could increase even if it becomes a "victi m"
of unequal exchange!
This apparent contradiction can be resolved with reference t o
equations

(2.10) and (2.11) which show that the change in factoral

terms of trade depends not only on the change in the commodity terms
of trade,

but also on the change

in

the ratio

of

the

la bor

productivities in the two economies. Thus, if a * LX falls in equati on
(2.2), the line AB in Figure 2.1 shifts to AB' and the line EFGH in
Figure 2.2 shifts to EF' G' H,

resulting in a deterioration of th e

South's terms of trade . Thus, a techn i ca 1 improvement in the expor t
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sector will either deteriorate or leave unchanged the commodity terms
of trade of the country concerned. What will actually happen can only
be predicted by making a Prebisch-Singer type of factual

anal ysis.

Fur ther , the impact on the factor a l terms of trade will be determined
by the equation (2.11). Thus , there is nothing misleading about the
fact that the commodity and the factoral terms of trade can move in
op po s ite directions .

It can be

shown that if labor producti vity in

the North increases steadily at a faster rate than that in the South.
The South always benefits from the faster growth rate in the North in
spite of the fact that its factoral

terms of trade "necessaril y"

worse n.
Emmanuel ( 1972) seems to maintain that trade between the "poo r"
and the "rich" countries leads to actual loss to the poor countri es.
He has criticized other approaches to unequal exchange on the grou nd
that they imply unequal sharing of advantages. Thus,

in connecti on

with his discussion on the famous controversy on German reparati ons
for war he says, "From this point of view, if unequal exchange did
take place, the inequality could relate only to the sharing of th e
advantages of international trade. Not only quantitatively but al so
qualitatively, what was involved was unequal exchange of a different
kind from that which I am going to discuss in this book, since in no
case could it mean more than a failure to gain, never an actual l oss"
(Emmanuel, 1972, p. xxii- xxiii). In this respect he seems to ha ve
transgressed the position maintained by Marx himself. Emmanuel qu otes
Marx as saying, "And even if we consider Ricardo's theory . . . thre e
days of one country's labor may be exchanged for a single day of
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another country's .... In this case the rich country exploits the poor
one, even if the latter gains through the exchange .. . " (se e Emman uel,
1972 , p. 92) . The Marxi s t theory of exploitation do es not i mp l y t hat
lab orer s are worse off through exchange of labor with the empl oyer
compared to a situation of unemployment.

In

the

Ricardian

model

unequal exchange in the non-equivalent sense is not incompatible wi th
both the countries being better-off through trade. The contradi c t ion
in Emmanuel's approach has become apparent in connection with hi s
recommendations for improvements. If trade implies "actual loss," t he
immediate pol icy prescription would be a dissociation

from

trad e.

Indeed, there have been suggestions for "delinking" or "dissociati on"
from trade (see Senghas, 1985).
before the poor countries

For Emmanuel,

however,

is not one of autarky,

the choi ce
but one of

diversification of industries between the two extremes of compl ete
specialization and autarky . Appropriate measures

in thi s dire c ti on

would, he believes, lead to gains to the poor country.
Finally, it can be pointed out that in determining
is equal or unequal

exchange,

Emmanuel

whether th ere

takes only national

li vin g

labor or direct labor into account and leaves indirect and past la bor
totally out of consideration on the ground that it has already been
"valorized". Thus , in Situation I he has equal exchange, since, as he
maintains , 120 units of B's national living labor exchange for 120
units of A' s national living labor when the exchange rate is 360 for
240 . This is a departure from the Mar xi an approach to value wher e
constant capital is regarded as congealed labor. This distorted lab or
theory of value leads him to keep the value of constant capi tal

43

unchanged when the total value of 1 iving labor in A goes up from 120
to 135 and that in 8 goes down from 120 to 105 after value has been
transformed into prices. A proper analysis, it will be argued bel ow ,
should not only take direct

labor,

but also

indirect labor

i nto

account if it is to stick to a 1abor theory of va 1ue. A 1 abor theory
of value which does not take the contributions of other factors of
production into account cannot be justified. In Emmanuel's scheme , th e
transformation of values into prices seems to have no bearing on
determining the exchange rates. The theory of the determination of
relative prices cannot be different from the theory of prices. Ricardo
did not have to face the problem of transformation of value

int o

prices, for, in his model there are no other factors of production. As
soon as any other factors of production are taken into account, they
have to be converted into categories of labor if labor theory of value
is to be abided by .
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CHAPTER IV
UNEQUAL EXCHANGE IN THE ASYMMETRIC SENSE
It was mentioned above that payment of a higher amount of labor
may not imply unequal exchange, for it might be associ a ted with a
higher amount of benefit . On the other hand,

unequal

exchange or

exploitation at a distance in the Marxian sense need not imply actual
loss from trade. In conformity with the idea that laborers stand to
gain by being employed even though they are being exploited, it can be
argued that exploitation implies that the distribution of gains f rom
the exchange involved is unequal - a position which Emmanuel tried to
refute . Laborers are not exploited if they are not employed.

But that

does not mean that a situation of unemployment is preferable to a
situation of employment.

What is true is that employers reap most of

the gains which accrue through employment of labor and production in
the Marxian sense.
Though the exchange analogy is not so appropriate in the case of
emp layers employing laborers, it is very appropriate in the case of
trade between countries. Thus, the question of unequal exchange is not
one of "actual loss" on the part of the poor nations as suggested by
Emmanuel (1972). It is rather a question of unequal distribution of
gains between the countries involved in international trade, namely
the "poor" countries on one hand, and the "rich" countries on the
other. It has been pointed out by Metcalfe and Steedman (1974) and
Ocampo (1976)

that compared to autarky,

trade always leads to an

outward shift of the wage-profit frontier,

leading to

a rise

in
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economic well-being. It will, however, be pointed out below

th at

trade might lead to actual losses in some special cases in a se nse
whi ch i s very different from that indicated by Emmanuel (1972).
Anderson (1976) has categorized unequal exchange arising out of
unequal distribution of gains as "asymmetric trade."

L.B.Shanin (see

Anderson, 1976) has discussed this concept in terms of distribution of
gains in labor-time . He discusses his point of view with reference t o
two economies, I and II, each producing two goods X and Y. He assu med
that the productivities of daily labor in economy I were x1 and y1 an d
the productivities of daily labor in economy II were x2 and y2 in X
and in Y respectively.
If economy I exports X to import Y at the price of
quantities of X for

"b"

quantities of Y, then the

"a"

gain in labor

time from trade for economy I is given by
( 4 .I)

b

I

Y1 - a

I xl

This is so because to produce
X,

"b"

economy

units of Y and

needs bl y 1
and al x 1
labor days
Similarly, for economy II, the gain in labor time is:

"a"

units of

respectivel y .

(4 . 2)
According to Shanin (see Anderson, 1976), the condition for equal
exchange is:
(4.3)

and equivalent exchange would require
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a 1 x1 = b I Yz

(4 . 4)

Now (4.3) and (4.4) will be the same if, and only if, we ha ve
bl y 1

=

al x2 , or, bla

=

y 11x 2 , that is, if the ratio of the price of

the imported good to the price of the exported good is equal to th e
ratio of domestic labor productivity in

the imported good sector to

the foreign labor productivity in the foreign country's import sector.
Thus,

the two concepts of equivalence will

coincide only in very

special instances. And, as is obvious from (4.3) and (4 . 4), it is mos t
likely that both asymmetric exchange and non-equivalent exchange would
be present at the same time .
Shanin's (see Anderson, 1976) concept of unequal exchange is very
similar to Ricardo's theory

of international trade, for there also

the gains consist of saving in labor time. Thus,

in the Ricardian

example discussed above in Chapter 2, by trading one Y for one X, th e
North saves 3 man-hours per unit, compared to producing X at home .
Using this extra labor time the North can produce 1.5 more units of Y.
Similarly, the South can save 10 man-hours with
1 unit more of X. Thus,

which it can produce

in trade, both parties are benefiting,

so

that the basis of trade is maintained . It can also be pointed out
that, since gains consist of reducing costs, the cost aspect of the
problem has not been neglected.
Now the question of savings or gains in labor-time arises becau se
only labor productivities or labor costs are considered. In reality
there are other resource costs, so it is legitimate to take into
account not only savings in labor-time,

but savings in all

other

resources as well. It can be pointed out that the same consideration s
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should be applied to the case of non -equivalent exchange which wa s
also framed so lely in terms of the amounts of labor exchanged. Thou gh
Emmanuel (1972) speaks of past labor, apparently in constant capi tal,
an explicit consideration of the total
production

exchanged would

obviously

be

amounts of all
more

factors of

preferable.

In

the

following a reformulation of the concepts involved ha s been sought to
take account of all factor s of production.
To the extent that all resources or all factors of production are
taken into account, the idea of asymmetric exchange involving une qual
distribution of gains can be tackled in terms of opportunity cost s.
The concept of opportunity costs takes all

resources

into account

which can be saved to produce another commodity if one unit less of a
specific

good

is

produced .

Thus, if (x 1 , y 1 ) and (x 2 ,y 2 ) stand
for the product i viti es of all resources in the production of X and Y

in economy I and economy II considered above respectively, then , gi ve n
the same prices, equation (4 . 1) would show the saving in opportunit y
cost for economy I,

and equation (4.2)

that for economy

II.

The

relation (4.3) would stand for equal exchange as before. The saving in
opportunity costs can also be regarded as net opportunity costs. If
net opportunity costs are unequal, we have unequal exchange in the
asymmetric sense.
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CHAPTER V
A REFORMULATION OF THE CONCEPT OF UNEQUAL EXCHANGE
The important question is how to measure the productivitie s of
all resources in the production of different commodities and , hen ce,
their opportunity costs . This question can be tackled if the con cep t
of opportunity cost of producing a commodity is developed careful ly .
This can be done as fo 11 ows. The opportunity cost of producing a
commodity is not measured in terms of resource costs or money. It i s
measured in terms of other commodities whose production has to be
reduced.

Thus, in a 2-commodity economy, the opportunity cost of

producing a commodity is measured by the extra amount of the other
commodity that could have been produced if one unit les s of th e
commodity under consideration were produced.

In a multi-commod ity

economy it should accordingly be measured in terms of the remaini ng
composite commodities that could have been produced if one. unit l ess
of the commodity under consideration were produced. The idea is th at
production of commodities needs resources, and when one commodit y i s
produced in a smaller quantity, resources are released which can be
utilised for the production of other commodities.
But production is a continuous process, and every commodity pla ys
a role in producing the economy ' s total

production . Thus,

resources that are used up in the production of one

th e

more unit of a

commodity will reduce the production of not only other goods, but will
reduce the production of the good under consideration in the ne xt
rounds of production . In the continuous process of production th e
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output

of every commodity depends

on

the output of every oth er

commodity. Thus, the production of all other commodities will affect
the production of this particular commodity in the next round of th e
production process and so on.
The idea under consideration is best captured by an input-outpu t
model where every output is also an input for all outputs includ ing
itself within the economy.

Thus

in an

input-output framework

th e

export of a commodity implies loss of inputs for the production of
every good including the commodity exported . This loss has cumulative
chain effects over time on the total

production of the economy .

Similarly , the import of a good leads to cumulative favorable cha i n
effects on the who 1e economy, s i nee the imported good is used in th e
production of all goods including the imported good itself.

The se

chain effects are often termed as "1 inkage effects" which vary f rom
one industry to another . Depending on the magnitudes of these linkag e
effects, the impacts of different

industries on the whole developme nt

of the economy is determined . Thus, to the extent opportunity co s t s
are calculated in terms of production of all commodities over t ime,
they take into consideration the who 1e deve 1opment of the econo my
which is consequent on them - a concept which is emphasized by the
idea of disjunctive exchange.
The concept of unequal exchange in the disjunctive sense point s
to the fact that the effects of trade may not be equally favorable for
the countries involved. According to Anderson (1976), trade i s
disjunctive in an absolute sense if it has positive impact on
development

in the more developed country, and hinders development in

the less developed.

Trade is disjuntive in a relative sense if i t
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leads to a faster development in the more developed country than i n
the less developed .
The reason for this kind of phenomenan, according to Ander son
(1976), may be due to a number of reasons. In the first place, it can
be due to forcefully manipulated trade which wa s a feature of
colonialism. Secondly, it can arise out of a very sizeable decline i n
the terms of trade following initial growth through trade, the case of
the so-ca lled "immiserizing trade." Anderson has also included under
this category of trade the case called "Graham's Parado x" in which two
products are exchanged, one being produced under diminishing return s,
the other enjoying increasing returns to scale. This case is rather
suspect,

since

increasing

and

diminishing

costs

will

have

their

impacts on the terms of trade which have been ignored . The point.
however, is that exports and import s have

linkage effects throughout

the whole economy which influence the development of the economies
concerned and, therefore, must be taken into consideration in
determining the net opportunity costs of trade in different countries.
Thus, the cost of export to a country is the whole development that
could have been achieved if the commodity were not exported at all so
that it could have been utilized to help produce the chain of goods in
general.

Similarly,

the gain

from import

is the total

economic development that can be made from the

amount of

imports . The net

opportunity cost is the net development effect.
It can be pointed out that this is an approach which is just the
opposite of the Keynesian approach, where export is regarded as an
exogenous demand giving rise to a positive mu ltiplier or development
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effect

on

the

economy,

and

import

ha s

a negative

multiplier or

development effect. Keynesian economi cs looks at export and impor t
f r om a demand point of view , where it is ass umed that the eco nomy wi ll
catch up with changes in demand.

In contrast, the present poin t of

view is a supply-side one , where export and import are r egard ed a s
inputs for production in general.
In order to ascertain the net opportunity costs of i mpor t and
e xport

one

can

ssume an

economy where

the

total

output s

of

x1 ,x 2 , .... . ,xn are produced in an input-output model to meet the fin al
bill of good s y 1 , y2, .... ,y n

(Leontief , 1968) . Thi s can be written as

XII + x12 +

+x1n+ Y1

xl

x21 + x22 +

+ x2n + Y2

x2

( 5 . I)

and

= xo

xol + xo2 + ···· + xon

where xij s tands for the amount of the produ ct of se ctor "i "

ab sorbed

as an input by sector "j ", and x0j for the amount of labor absorb ed as
input by sector "j." Thus, x0 stands for the total wagebill. Since t he
net output is the same as the final

demand,

subtraction of inte r -

indu s try demands from gross output yields :
(x 1

x 11 )

-x 12

x21 + (x2 - x22l
(5 . 2)

·········

-xln

Yl

-X2n

Y2
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and
xa!

+ xaz

+ · ···•···· ··· · · · + xan = xa

The quantity of the output of sector i absorbed by sector
unit of

j' s

per

tot a1 output is represented by the symbo 1 a i j and i s

called the input coefficient of sector "i" into sector "j."

where

j

Thus

= 0 indicates labor .

A su bstitution of equations (5 .3) into (5 . 2) yield s n

gen eral

equilibrium re lationships between the total outputs x1,x 2, ... ,xn and
the fi na 1 bi 11 of goods YJ ,y2, . . . . ,yn:
(I

all)Xj

-alzxz - · · · · · ·

-a2lxl + (1-azz)xz -

alnxn = YJ
a2nxn

Yz

(5.4)
-anlxl

anzxz

-

and
·· · · • · · · ··· +

aanxn = xa

In order to investigate the viability of the sys tem (5 .4) where
availability of labor is not a constraint , the la st equation
is omitted. Then (5.4) can be written in the succinct form
(5 . 5)

(l-a)x=y ,

in (5.4 )
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where
X = XI

y

Yl

I 0 . . .. 0

x2

Y2

0 I. . . . 0

xn

Yn

0 0. . . . I

'

and
a

The general
unknown x's

solution of these equilibrium equation s

in terms of the given y's can

be pre se nt ed

for

th e

in

t he

f ollowing form :

(5. 6)

The constants A;j are the multipliers indicating by how mu ch x; would
i ncrease if yj

were increased by one unit.

alte r natively as

(5. 7)

X = {! - a)-1 y =A y

( 5. 6)

can be writ t en
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where the matrix

(5.8)

is the inve rse of the matrix

(5.9)

Only if all the Aij are nonnegative will there nece ssa rily exis t a set
of positive total outputs for any given s et of final

deliveries. A

s ufficient condition for the nonnegativity of the Aij i s that in the
s tru ct ural matrix [a] the sum of the coefficients in eac h column (or
in each row) be not larger than one and that at 1east one of th ese
co lumn s (or row) sums be smaller than one.
Th is real input-output sys tem has a dual price system where the
price

that

each

productive

sector

receives

must

equal

its

total

payments per unit of output for inputs purchased from it se lf and fr om
other

industries,

plus a "value added"

per unit of output,

whi ch

essenti ally represents payments made to the exogenous sec t ors .
Defi ning Pi as the price received by industry i and Vi as the value
added by indu s try i per unit of output, these equation s are
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(I-a 11 Jp 1

-a 21 p2 -

-an!Pn

-a 12 p1 +(I-a 22 Jp 2 -

= VI

-anzPn = Vz

(5. 10)
..... + (1-annlPn

= Vn

Or, alternatively
(5.11)

(1-a')p=V

Each equation describes the balance between the price rece i ved and
payments made by each endogenous sector per unit of its product; Vi
represents the payments made by sector i, per unit of its product , to
all exogenous (that is, final demand) sectors.

Vi usually consists of

wages, interest, profits, and taxes paid to the government and so on.
The solution of the

price equations (5.10) or (5.11) allow s the

determination of prices of all products from given values added by
eac h sector. The solution can be written as

( 5 . 12)

or,
( 5.13)

p = (! - a')-! V = A'V

The constant Aij measures the dependence of the price of the prod uct
of sector jon the value added by sector i. Only if all the Aij i n the

56
price so lution are nonnegative will there ne cessar il y exist posit ive
pr i ces

allowing

each

sec tor

to

balance

exactly

it s

input -out put

accou nt s in value terms for any given set of positive values added.
Since Aij in the price solution equals Aji

in the output so luti on ,

this condition is the same as that needed to assume positive output s
for any given set of final demand s.
Exports

can be introduced by considering them as an addition t o

the fi na 1 demand vector.

Thu s, if only commodity I is exported, th e

final demand column is given by
Y] + ll Y]

= Y + ll Y] , where

Y

Y]

Y2

Y2

Yn

Yn

and

Thus, the total output needed

to

meet

the

final demand

of

y +

ll y 1 is, by relation (5 . 7) , given by

It follows that when

ll YJ is exported the total resource set used t o

produce it is given by

ll x 1 = A ll y 1 . This set constitutes th e

oppor tunity cost of exporting

tl y 1 . This set of resources could ha ve

been used to produce some other domestic goods.

57

When

!o Yz is imported, the domestic production of y2 is redu ced
by an equivalent amount to meet the home demand for y2 . This reduct io n
in domestic production releases certain amount of resources,

f', x2 = A

f', y2, which is obtained as follows:
X

-

!o

x2

A [Y- 6 Y2 ]•

where
!o

Y2

l'']

These released resources can be utilized to produce other commodities.
This is the opportunity gained by the society from importing
The net gain to the society of exporting
import of

!o

!o y .

2

!oY] in exchange for an

y2 can be expressed as

Similarly, for the other country which exports

!o y 2

to import !o y1, the

net gain to that country will be given by

If the superscripts S and N are used for the South and the North
respec tively, the condition for the North to gain more than the South
from trade between them so that there is

unequal exchange accordin g

to the criterion adopted, will be given (Appendix I) by
( 5.14)
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Such a formulation in terms of total resources can also be made
for Emmanuel ' s concept of unequal exchange, which has been called nonequivalent exchange here . Since

AS t> Y1 is the total resource cost of
AN "' Yz i s the total resource cost of

the South to export

ll y1 and

the

"'Yz, the South will suffer from unequal exchange

North to export

if
( 5.15)
The relations

(5.14)

and

(5.15)

give

the

conditions

fo r

asymmetric and non-equivalent exchange when all resources are tak en
into account . The

formulation

of unequal

exchange

that

has

been

adopted here is given by the relation (5.14). In this formulation th e
concept of disjunctive exchange has no separate measure since t he
total amounts of resources gained and lost by the society over time i s
captured by the relation

(5.14).

This

is equivalent

to tota l

deve 1opments fo 11 owing from trade which the concept of d·i sj un ct i ve
exchange tries to evaluate.

The only difference is that the concept

of disjunctive exchange gives more weight to spinoff effects th at
might follow from trade.
exchange cannot

take

coefficie nt s will

The present formulation of the asymmetri c

account

of

these

effects,

usually change over time.

because
Thus,

coefficie nt s are appropriately changed over time,

the

I-0

if the

I- 0

the present

formulation of the asymmetric exchange will tend to coincide with th e
formulation for the di sju nctive exchange.
The
asymmetric

relations

(5.14)

and

(5.15)

showing

the

conditions

for

exchange and non-equivalent exchange respectively

are
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expressed

in terms

of matrices.

To make

it more manageable and

meaningful, the following analysis assumes labor as the only pri mary
factor of production - a method standardized by Leontief

(1968).

Thi s leads to an adoption of the labor theory of value. But, here the
difference is that total labor costs would be different from dir ect
labor costs , for total labor costs include not only direct labor cost s
but indirect labor costs as well. Thus, the implicit value theory in
the Leontief open system is different from the simple labor theory of
value .

It contains an implicit labor theory of value in the sen se

that equilibrium prices for all final demands would be proportional t o
the total labor requirement coefficients (Lancaster, 1968).

The tot al

labor requirement coefficient for industry j is obtained by operatin g
the whole system so as to produce a net output of one unit of j an d
zero net outputs elsewhere . An equilibrium set of prices in th is
context means a set of prices which is such that , if the wage le vel
just enables labor to purchase the net output of the economy, profit s
are exactly zero in all industries.

If x'

is the vector for unit

operation of j and zero operation elsewhere,

then from ( 5. 6) and

( 5. 7) , x ' is given by
X'

since

(5.17)

X'

= Aj
(I

a

,-1

0

I·

OJ

0

Aj
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where
Aj

0 0

0

,0 0

0

and the total labor requirement for unit operation of j , which is
labeled aoj• is given by
(5.18)
where ao is the vector of input coefficients for labor and the el ement
aoj in this vector is the total labor input coefficient for industry j
( Appendix 2) .

The relationship between the total labor content and

the price can be illustrated by a simplified two-industry economy. The
constraint imposed by the total availability of labor determine s t he
consumption -pass i bi l ity frontier of the economy (Dorfman, Samuel son
and Solow, 1958). If x0 is the total supply of labor available t o t he
ec onomy, then it is given by

(5 . 19)

But the gross outputs, x1 and x2, can be expressed as
functions of the final demands shown in (5.6). Thus,

(5. 20)

Xj

Allyl + A12Y2

x2

A21Y1 + A22Y2

lin ear
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Subs tituti on of (5.20) into (5 . 19) gives

or,

( 5. 21)

= Ao1Y1 + Ao2Y2
=

xa

where A01 represents the direct and indirect labor content in a unit
of final consumption of commodity I , and A02 th e total direct and
indirect labor content in a unit of final consumption of commodity 2.
Thi s linear consumption possibility frontier (Figure 5.1) ha s the
co nstant marginal

rate of substitution given by

Aor/Ao2· In equilibrium the relative prices of the two commodities

p1;p 2 =
Since Aol is the total content of I unit of final output of

the same as the marginal rate of

Ao1 / Ao2·

is

substitution . Thus, we have

commod ity I , and since labor is the only cost-generating element in
t he sys tem , we have in equilibrium in the sense defined above

where

w is the wage rate .
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0

FIGURE 5. 1. CONSUMPTION-POSSIBILITY FRONTIER FOR AN
ECONOMY PRODUCING TWO GOODS X AND Y WITH A GIV'EN
AMOUNT OF LABOR
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In general, let p be a price vector proportional to the t otal
labor requirements vector, so that p = k.a 0 where K is an arbitrary
vec tor. If the fi na 1 demand vector is c, the va 1ue of fi na 1 demand i s
pc. If L is the total labor used to produce this bill of goods , then L
= a0 .c. But, if the wage rate, w, is such that 1abor can just buy the
bill of goods, it follows that wl = wa 0c = pc = ka 0c , so that w = k.
It can be shown that, at the 1abor theory of va 1ue prices , the 1abor
intensity of unit values of all commodities is the same. Since direct
labor varies from industry to industry,

this highlight s the point

that direct 1abor coefficients do not properly represent

relative

labor intensities. Since the labor input coefficients vectors vary
from country to country, the labor theory of value prices for the same
goods in different countries would differ,

providing a scope f or

gainful trade.
With this new perspective, the concepts of non-equivalent and
asymmetric exchanges which were originally framed in terms . of direct
labor exchanged and

direct

labor-time

saved

respectively

can

be

re formulated. A proper view of the labor theory of value needs total,
rather than direct, labor to be taken into consideration .
South exports

6 y 1 at the given commodity terms-of-trade, the total

labor requirement for 6 y 1 is, from (5.18),
in the South. Similarly, the total
in the North is
wo uld imply
(5.23)

If the

1abor

equal to
requirement to produ ce

l: aN 0 . AN· 2 ) 6 y 2 . Thus, equivalent exchange
i
1
1
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If only direct labor is considered, equivalent exchange woul d
imply
(5.24)
The two expressions on either side of (5.23) give the tot al
amounts of labor needed to produce the exports in the respectiv e
co untries. Thus, the exports of goods are transformed into exports oF
labor from the respective countries . In a similar way imports of goo ds
are equivalent to savings of domestic labor . Thus the total amount of
labor saved through the import of
t1y2

and

the

in the North

t1 y 2 in the South is ( l: aS iASi )
0
2
i
amount of labor saved through the import of t,y

total
is

( ~ aNoiANil)

t, y 1 . Thus,

1

taking the

left-hand

expression in (5.23) into account, t he net gain to the South will be
given by
(5 . 25)

( l: aSOi ASi 2 ) f1 Y2
i

while the net gain to the North is
(5.26)
Thus, asymmetric exchange would imply that (5.25) and (5.26) are not
equal to one another. If f1y 1 and
(5.26) will give

f1 y 2 are in value terms, (5 . 25) and

the net gains to the respective economies in valu e

terms.
So far

as the disjunctive exchange

is concerned,

it

can

be

pointed out that since the concept of asymmetric exchange has been
developed to take account of the total

net gains to the societies

1
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involved, the two concepts tend to coincide when the I-0 coeffici ents
are properly adjusted over time to consider the spinoff effects of
trade.
From the above analysis certain corollaries follow:
(a)

There can exist non-equivalent exchange in Emmanuel's sen se,

but unequal exchanges in the present sense may not exist .
both can co-exist .
equivalence

Of cour se,

It might be possible for the extent of non·

to be greater if measured by the adopted formulation th an

by Emmanuel's measure.
(b) Asymmetric exchange in Shanin's (see Anderson, 1976) sense
can exist, but unequal exchange in the present sense may not. Of
course, both can co-exist.
if measured

by

the

Again, the asymmetry can well be great er

present

formulation

rather

than

by

Shanin' s

measure.
(c)

All the three aspects of unequal exchange can be present at

the same time.
(d) A "poor" country may gain more than her "rich" partner. In
that case unequal exchange would favor the poor country against its
rich counterpart.

As relations (5 . 25) and (5.26) show, this might

happen as a result of either, or both, the following factors bein g
present. In the first place, the commodity terms of trade may be
heavily in favor of the poor country. This is quite plausible if the
poor country is "small".

If her rich partner is

"big",

then

the

equilibrium terms of trade will invariably tilt in favor of the small
country .
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Secondly, in many developing poor countries the export sec t or i s
"l e ading" sector, giving rise to economic externalities such as
bac kward and forward lin kages (Hir sc hman , 1958), availability of l abor
with different skills (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943 ; Scito vs ky, 1954) , and
the training of labor (Myint,

1971; Katz, 1984 , Pack and West phal,

1986). If these externalities are properly taken into account of, the
net drain on the economy due to export would be much l ess. Th is,
together with the terms of trade tilted in favor of the poor country,
may result

in a poor country gaining more from unequa l

exchan ge

through trade with a rich country.
That this is a distinct possibility is shown by the followin g
application of the results (5 .2 5) and (5 . 26)

to the case of trad e

between Ecuador with a "less developed" economic structure and

the

USA with a "more developed" economic structure. In order to app l y th e
measures (5.25) and (5.26), severa l assumpt ions have been made. In the
first place , the 87 sector Input-Output Structure of the U.S . Econ omy :
1963 (Survey of Current Busine ss, Nov emb er , 1969) has been co nd ensed
into a 7 by

matri x to make

it conformab l e with

Interindustry Transactions Table for Ecuador,

the 9 sector

1963 (Yotopoulos and

Nugent, 1976), which ha s also been converted into a 7 by 7 matri x.
Secondly,

the U.S.

s alaries which

table does not contain any row for wages

is available

in

the

Ec uadorian Table .

and

Wage s and

s ala ries of each sector have been calculated from data for va lue add ed
for each sector by utilizing the fact

that

"of the total

in come

generated in the U.S. economy each year, about 80 per cent i s in the
form of wages" (Petersen and Lewi s, 1986) . It

is

also

not iced

that
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imports by the United States from Ecuador consist mainly of fi sh,
food,

cocoa, co ffee , oil

seeds,

petroleum and

products.

categorized

agriculture .

as

textile and sawmill

These

imports

Simi l ar l y,

the

have,
main

produ cts , and

therefore,
export

items

been
to

Ecuador from the United States co nsist of grains and preparation s ,
vegetab l e oils, fats, refined waxes, tobacco manufactures, auto par ts
and chemicals. The se have been categorized into the manufacturi ng
sector. Assuming that the value of import is equal to the value of
export, the net gains to the USA

and

Ecuador have

been calculated

for one dollar worth of export and for one dollar worth of import. Th e
estimated net gain for the U.S. economy for 1963 per unit dollar worth
of trade has been found to be .0846953 and that for Ecuador has been
found to be .1194266. To the extent that the procedures followed are
correct,

it shows that it is not the U.S., but Ecuador, which i s

gaining more from trade between them.
the U. S.

during 1963

(Appendix 3).

involved

Thus, trade between Ecuador an d

unequal

excha nge,

favoring

Ecuad or
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CHAPTER VI
A RECAPITULATION : SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
The above analysis has deviated from Emmanuel's (1972) approach
in view of the critique developed in Chapter 3 above. The
that

has

criticisms,

been

adopted

here

but also to

tries

probe

not

into

only

the

to get

problems

appr oach

around

those

that developi ng

co untries of the present-day world face . They need international trad e
for development purposes. But,

instead of looking at trade as "an

eng ine of growth", they often feel that their gains are smaller

than

those reaped by the developed countries . The purpose of the pre se nt
study was to investigate whether or not there was any basis for such a
sentiment.
following

It has been suggested that the problem can be s tu died
the traditional

Ricardian lines using Shanin ' s

(see

Anderson, 1976) approach to unequal exchange , called the asymmet ric
exchange. It has the advantage of being able to explain th e ba sis of
trade by the fact that

both parties stand to gain through trade in a

fashion similar to Ricardo's theory of trade. Shanin 's approach has
been reformulated to take into account

not only the direct labo r

costs, but also the indirect labor costs involved . According to thi s
approach, Ricardo's model as outlined in Chapter 2 can be present ed as
follows:
North
X

5 >=<( EaNo·
AN·x)
.
1
1
1

y

2 >=< ( ~ aNOi ANiy)
1

South
10 >=<( E. a so.1 Asixl
1

20 >=<( E. as a·1 Asivl
1
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( 1: aNOi ANiY ) I ( 1: aNOi ANi X

If

1

is

than ( 1: aSOi ASiY) I

less

i

1

( 1:i aS 0 1. AS·xl
1

the North has a comparative advantage in the production

of Y, and it will produce and export Y to import X in which the South
en joy s a

comparative

Px I Py)

would

advantage . The equilibrium

terms of trade ( P=

somewhere between ( 1:• aN 0 1. AN·xl
1 (1:. aN 0 1. AN·y)
1
1

be

1

1

and ( ~ asoi Asixl I ( ~aS 0 i ASiYl and not between 512 and 112 as in th e
1

1

Ricardian model, because the total 1 abor costs are usually different
from the direct labor costs. The gains from trade can be calculated by
using the relation (5 .2 5).
Lewis's (1969) presentation can be similarly reformulated as below:
Steel
North

Food

3>=<11 ( l: aN 0 iANisl

Coffee

3 >=< l l ( ~aNoiANiF)

1

1

1>=<11 ( ~ asoiAsicl

So uth

1

According to this presentation the equilibrium terms of trade may
or may

not

be

1:1.

If now

there

is

technical

progre ss

in

the

produc tion of coffee in the South, it will reduce not on 1y the dire ct
labor costs of producing coffee in the South, but it will reduc e the
indirect labor costs of producing coffee, as well. This implie s that
the terms of trade would derteriorate further than could be expected
in the Lewis's framework . As has been pointed out

in Chapter 2,

technical progress in the export sector tends to deteriorate the term s
of trade not only in the case of a developing country, but in the case
of all countries as well . Similarly, technical progress in the nontrade d food sector improves the

terms of trade of all

countries

irrespective of whether they are developed or developing ones.
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But, it can be pointed out these Lewis-1 ike results need t o be
ex amined more carefully since they depend on two critical

impli cit

ass umptions, namely that (a) there are only three commodit ie s, of
which two are traded, and that (b) the non-traded good is the same in
both the countries. The latter assumption implies that the opportuni ty
costs of the traded goods can be measured in terms of the common non traded good, which is food in the Lewisian model.
If these two assumptions are relaxed to take account of more than
three commodites and non-common, non-unique and non-traded goods, th en
there are no unique opportunity costs of the traded goods . This is
more realistic than the case envisaged by Lewis

(1969).

In thi s

s ituation the opportunity costs cannot be calculated in terms of oth er
good or goods in general; they have to be calculated in terms of th e
total resource costs, which are total labor costs in the present ca se .
The total labor costs of producing different commodities in their turn
are equivalent to their equilibrium prices
theory of value.

in the Leontief lab or

Sever a 1 r e.s u1t s f o 11 ow . In the f i r s t p1 ace ,

technical progress in the exportable sector of any country will ten d
to reduce the price of the exportable good, deteriorating the term s of
trade. To the extent technical progress reduces the amounts of other
commodities needed,

in

addition to

reducing

the amount of labor

needed, the deterioration in the terms of trade would be still higher.
In the case of a "big" country, this can lead to Bhagwati's (1958)
"immiserizing growth" case.
Secondly,

the exportable

sector

is

a

generates favorable economic externalities

"leading"

sector

th at

in many developi ng
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countries . In that case , the technical progress in the ex por ta ble
sector will "spillover" to other sectors including the non-t rad ed
sectors . This will improve the terms of trade, and it might even be
imagined that the benefits to the non-traded sector is so very great
that the net result can be an improvement in the terms of trade. Thi s
externa 1ity factor can perhaps exp 1ain why over ti me th e t erms oF
trade are not reduced to zero in the face of cant i nued techn i ca 1
progress . Of course , there are other factors restri c ting thi s
tendency, namely, that there can be technical improvements in the non traded sectors and that there can be technical improvements in t he
foreign country's exportable sector as well .
Thirdly, in an I-0 framework with more than one non-traded go od,
technical progress anywhere in the non-traded sector , including th e
food sector, can even deteriorate the country's terms of trade thr ough
a reduction in the price of the exportable commodity . This re sult goes
totally against Lewis's (1969) predictions .
Finally , since the concept of a just price in the sense of a
Paretian optimum price

cannot capture externalities, the expor tabl e

sector may have to be treated as a "leading" sector . In that case th e
concept of unequal exchange in Emmanuel's (1972) sense cannot be
justified for it does not take into consideration the impacts of
changes in the export sector on other sectors of the economy. In thi s
respect, the concept of disjunctive effect would be more appropri at e.
The measure suggested here would then need necessary modificat i on s t o
take account of changes in the I-0 coefficients over time .
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A. Policy Considerations
Pol icy questions can be considered with reference to the fac t
that unequal exchange implies that
w*; w .; 1
From (2 . 5) we have

=

MPL*x/ MPly . t

If as a result of technical progress MPL\ rises, but w* cannot
rise because of institutional factors,

it will imply a fall

leading to a deterioration of the terms of trade.

in p*X

As previ ously

pointed out, there is a tendency for the price to fall

everywhere

following a techni ca 1 progre ss in the sec tor concerned. But, if the
rise in productivity is followed by a proportional rise in the wage
rate, the price will not fall .
wage

In many labor-surplu s countries th e

rate can be considered as something constant , being determi ned

largely in the agricultural sector and not particularly re spo ns i ve to
cha nges in productivity elsewhere. These countries are most likel y to
suffe r from a greater amount of deterioration in the term s of trad e
due to techn i ca 1 improvement in it s exportab 1e sector. Si ne e the wage
rate does not change, the effect of technical progress leads to a
greater reduction

in the price of the export good

leading

to

a

sizea ble decline in the terms of trade . The beneficial effect s of
technical progress would be transmitted to the foreign country to a
large extent .
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The pol icy conclusions from the above discussion are th at
mechanisms must be found to increase the wage rate if the terms of
trade are to be improved. The most genera 1 and basic of the po 1 icy
measures would be population control. Without this, all other pol icy
prescriptions can only have temporary effects . It is so basic that i ts
importance cannot be overemphasized.

Secondly,

help to improve the employed laborers'
em ployers.

As

a result ,

increase following

there would

technical

progress.

unionization wou 1d

position vis -a-v i s the

be greater chances

of wage

Thirdly, wage rise can be

tagged to profit or productivity rise . This also would require strong
unions .
The relations (5.25) and (5 . 26), which use the real aspects of
the terms of trade, imply that the gains from trade depend not onl y on
the commodity terms of trade, but a 1so on the I -0 coefficients .

The

I-0 coefficients depend on technical knowledge, labor productiviti es
and

so on.

Improvement

in

labor

productivities,

partic~larl y

in

co ntra st to the low productivity of labor in agriculture in the "poor"
countries, has, as it has been

pointed out above, an adverse effect

on the commodity terms of trade . In this respect, developing countrie s
seem to be caught in an inextricable trap.

Thus, what is apparen t

from the above discussion is that the concept that trade is "an engin e
of growth" should be more carefully examined. In the initial stages of
eco nomic development, when a lot of externalities can be expected to
follow, trade can be regarded as an engine of growth s ince it is the
deve 1oping "poor" countries which are 1 ike 1y to benefit more from
unequal exchange.

After development has been well under way and when

74
not many externalities can be expected to follow, trade may cease to
be an engine of growth, and poss i b1y, the poor country may start t o
lose most of the benefits from technical programs to its rich partn ers
through trade.
The relations (5.25) and (5.26) also show that the net gain s fr om
trade depend not only on the commodity terms of trade, but also on t he
economic situations prevailing within the economy, as reflected in t he
input-output coefficients . Thus,
developing

countries will

have

for economic development th e
to

change

their

input-outpu t

coefficients, which is tantamount to changing the whole structure of
the economy itself. This cannot be expected from trade alone. To t he
extent export helps to generate demand for the unutil ized resour ces
such as unemployed labor and other materials, it is certainly a gain.
But export can become a drain on the economy even when

privat e

producers may find it profitable to export. Keeping these facts i n
perspective, we can make the fo 11 owing po 1icy prescriptions to redu ce
un equal exchange if there is any :
(a) Import and export those commodities whose production in vol ves
highest fac i 1 it i es for trans fer of techno 1ogy .

The more the non.

export sectors gain from such transfer of technology, the better .
(b)

Import those commodities which

have

large total

1 inkage

effects . These 1 inkage effects will help development of the enti re
economy .
(c)
effects.

Export

those

commodities

that

have

small

total

link age

Labor-intensive commodities would be good examples.

But ,

after deve 1opment has been under way for a cons i derab 1e time, the re
will be no special way to distinguish between the two.
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(d) Increase labor productivity in all sectors so that the i nput
coefficients can be decreased . Lewis's (1969) case was a special one ,
where productivity in

food

stood

for

productivities

of labor

in

genera 1 in the rest of the economy .
(e) An improvement in the commodity terms of trade will alway s
improve the situation. Thus, it contradicts Bacha's (1978) contention
that a deterioration in the commodity terms of trade is a necessary
condition for an improvement in the economic well-being.
(e) Reduce population growth so that Wcan grow .
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Appendix 1.

Matrix Calculations for Unequal Exchange

Where the North Gains More Than the South

A t:. yz

.... aln
azz .. .. azn

all a12
azl

r

a12 t:. Yz

:,,
0

················
an2 .... ann

ani

azz t:. yz

an2 t:.Yz

Similarly,

azi

azz · · · • azn

o
0

Thus,
[A

t:.Yz

-

A t:, YJ]

a12 t:. Yz

-

azz t:. Yz

all

6 YJ

az!

6 YJ

···· ··· ·················
anz t:. Yz
And

[AS t:. Yz - As 6YJ]
implies
aSI2 t:.Yz - aS!! t:.YJ
5
5
a 22 Mz - a 21 t:.YJ

... . . ··· ·· ·······

s
a n2

t:.Yz

s
a nl

6YJ

[AN t:.YJ - AN

<

<

ani

t:. Yz ]

aNI! 6 YJ - aNI2 t:. Yz
aN21 6 YJ - aN22 t:. Yz

····· · ···· . ....

t:,

YJ
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Appendix 2.

Matrix Calculations for Unit Operation
of the jth Sector

and
X'

( 1 - a

1

) rO

~~

=

Aj

=tO 0

Alj

OJ

~. ~. ::.~~~ .. ~

0

0 0 ..

Anj

0

Therefore,
0 0

0

0 0 . . A2 j 0 . . 0

0 0 •.

Anj 0 . .

0
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Ap pendi x 3.

Input-Output Tables and Cal culations for the

Di stribution of Gains From Trade Between
Ecuador and the USA

Interindustry Coefficient Matrix for Ecuador,1963 ,
Reduced To 7 From 9 Producing Sectors
Row & Co lumn 1 = Agriculture; Row & Column 2 = Live stock ;
Row & Column 3 = Mining ; Row -& Column 4 = Manufacturing ;
Row & Column
5 = Construction ; Row & Column
6
Tran sport & Commerce; Row & Column 7 = Others; Row 8 =
Labor .

.0278

2

3

4

5

6

.095

.002

. 1154

0

0

.002

2

0

0

0

.0173

0

0

.0005

3

0

0

0

.0418

.17

. 0003

0

.048

.2375

.303

. 2389 . 1478

0

0

0

4
5

. 0378
0

0

0

.0409
0

6

. 2276

. 154

.0399

. 1383

.0373

. 1376

0

7

.0095

.0088

.018

. 0418

.0302

. 0569 . 0299

8

. 166

. 283

. 343

.138

.3792

.3218 .6764

Source: Yotopoulos and Jeffrey , 1976, pp . 58 - 59.
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If this

by 7 matrix is

called E, then (I - E) -1 is gi ve n by

3
1. 0435

3

6

.11312 .047614 . 18548 .053918 .032466 .010029

.002148

1.0022 .00655

.02665 . 007705 .004678 .001645

.005238

. 00539 1. 0158

.06438 . 18858

. 12737 .37739

I. 538

4 .12318

6

4

. 44355

. 01157

. 002728

. 26802 .06516

0

0

0

0

. 29578

. 2295

. 12125

. 3033

.13871

I. 2125 .01352

. 033

.0292

.04275

. 0873

.6248

.08324 1.0346

0

0

5i nee manufacturing goods are imported by Ecuador from the USA. which
imports agricultural goods from Ecuador, the net gain to Ecuador fo r
one dollar worth of trade is given by

( l:.
l

a EO.l AE.l 4) - ( l:. a EO l. AE.l I)
l

= [( . 18548)(.166) + (.026651)( .283) + (.064379)(.343)
+ (1.538)( . 138) + 0 + ( . 3033)(.3218) + (.0873)(.6764))

[(1.0435)(.166) + ( . 0021475)( . 283) + (.0052377)(.343)
+ ( . 12318)(.138) + 0 + ( . 29578)( . 3218) + ( . 033)(.6764))

=. 4293283 - . 3099017
= .1194266
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Input-Output Coefficients For The U.S . Economy,
1963, Reduced To 7 From 87 Sectors
Row & Column
Row & Column
Row & Column
Row & Column

I = Livestock; Row & Column 2 = Agriculture
3 = Mining ; Row & Column 4 = Construction
5 = Manufacturing;Row & Column 6 = Transport
7 = Others; Row 8 = Labor.
4

. 178

. 069

0

2

.3216

.0847

0

3

0

5

6

. 0356

. 00004

. 002

.0038

. 0218

.0016

.006

. 0003

. 0028

. 055

. 0086

. 0303

. 0006

. 006

4

.0075

. 012

.02

. 0003

. 002

. 028

.0238

5

. 151

. 1294

.1018 . 37

. 398

. 064

. 068

6

.0247

. 015

.028

. 026

.069

.028

. 075

. 178

.2784 . 1494

.1175

.063

.1841

. 2006

. 415

.4297 . 3472

. 2856

. 532

. 545

8

.034

Source: Survey of Current Business , U.S . Department
Of Commerce, November 1969 .
If this 7 by 7 matrix is called A, the {I
2

3

4

5

A)-I is given by
6

3.1840

2.1463 2.6667 2. 0135 2.0191

.7526 8.0932

1. 1212

1.8573

. 04787

.9481 .7314

.754

.2714 2.8625

.0469

1.1095 .0631

. 0878

. 0179 .13561

. 06305

. 0646

. 08616 1.0515 . 0536

5

1. 1883

1.0908 1.2509 1. 4249 2. 4805

.4322

6

. 162

. 145

. 189

. 169

.1624

1.1216 . 4565

.7 488

.7986

1.041

.777

. 7597

.2922

3

.0485 .1925
3.19

3.1707
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Beca use of the pattern of trade between Ecuador and the USA menti oned
above, the net gain to the U.S. economy per dollar of trade is giv en
by

= [(2.1463)(.2006) + (1.8573)( . 415) + ( .046911)(.4297) +
(.064594)(.3472) + (1 . 0908)(.2856) + (.14512)( . 532) +
(. 79862)(.545)] - [(2.0191)(.2006) + (.75414)( . 415) +
(.087824)(.4297) + ( . 053555)(.3472) + (2 . 4805)(.2856) +
(.16244)(.532) + (.75967)( . 545)]
=2.0678959 - 1.9832006
=.0846953.
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